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Abstract
During the Anti-Japanese War, Chongqing was the 
center of the western region where was a great rear 
area for supporting the Anti-Japanese War in China. 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) mainly used 
political guiding methods to implement its political 
influence to various political forces in the great rear area. 
The Communist Party of China held high the banner 
of anti-Japanese and democracy to made important 
contributions for maintaining the cooperation with the 
party of Kuomingtang (KMT), change the middle forces’ 
recognition for the Communist Party of China, reform the 
political system, defend the Shensi, Kansu and Ningxia 
border region and so on. These activities had set up its 
historical position as a political guider in the great rear 
area, laid a solid foundation for the victory of the Anti-
Japanese War, and realized the organic unity of the 
interests of the nation and the party.
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INTRODUCTION
The incident on July 7, 1937 not only marked the 
beginning of Japan’s all-out aggression against China, 
but also opened a new journey for Chinese resistance. 
In the country’s stake, the Kuomintang (KMT) and 
the Communist Party through their policy adjustment 
eventually established an Anti-Japanese National United 
Front based on Kuomintang and the communist party 
cooperation, which laid a solid foundation for finally 
defeating Japanese imperialists and achieving the great 
victory in the Anti-Japanese War. As the center of the 
western region where was a great rear area for supporting 
the Anti-Japanese War, Chongqing became an important 
stage for various political powers. In this special historical 
background of the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist 
Party of China mainly exerted its political influence over 
various political powers in the great rear area without 
interfering Kuomintang government power. This kind of 
political guiding model made important achievements and 
thus set CPC historical position in the rear base.1
The historical contributions of Communist Party’s 
Political Guidance in the Great Rear Area mainly were in 
the following aspects. 
1 During the war of resistance against Japan, relations between 
CPC and Chinese main political forces are not clearly defined in 
academia. Though there is a lot of discussion about the contribution 
and historical position of the Communist Party during the war, the 
historical contributions and historical position of CPC should be 
different in different regions when we consider the complicated 
political situation. In the specific regions, the historical contributions 
and status of CPC should be recorded. Therefore, the purpose of this 
paper is to give a description about the historical contributions and 
historical position of the Communist Party of China in a specific 
region: The great rear area.
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1.  PERSISTED THE POLITICAL LINE: 
CPC SUCCESSFULLY SUSTAINED THE 
KMT-CPC COOPERATION AND SET UP 
THE FOUNDATION FOR THE VICTORY 
OF THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR IN CHINA
The leader of CPC, Mao Zedong pointed out, “An 
important part of political line of Communist Party of 
China is the political line of unity and struggle with 
the bourgeoisie”(Mao, 1991, p.608). The key of the 
political line was the relation between the Kuomintang 
and the Communist party. Because the Kuomintang 
and the Communist Party did not reach a agreement in 
the cooperation program and the form of cooperation 
organization, the political reality of a strong Kuomintang 
and a weak Communist party made the inferior side, the 
Communist Party of China, face more challenge, which 
also needed the Communist Party of China to have more 
political intelligence to maintain the fragile relation 
between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.
The Communist Party of China had placed the national 
interests in the first during the process of maintaining 
the KMT-CPC relations. CPC adhered to the “brother’s 
quarrel at home but together resist against outsiders’ 
invading”, was tolerance for the national interests, and 
maintain the cooperation between Kuomintang and CPC. 
In the early Anti-Japanese War, the KMT and CPC had 
close cooperation in the political, military, cultural and 
other aspects, launched the Anti-Japanese and national 
salvation movement in the country, delayed the crazy 
attack of the Japanese army, broke the Japanese arrogant 
plan which planed to destroy China in three months, and 
made the Japanese army go into a war quagmire. The 
Communist Party of China repeatedly dispelled various 
doubts, repeatedly explained that Kuomintang and the 
communist party cooperation “was the cooperation for a 
long period of time, rather than a short period or playing 
a political game” (Mao, 1937/1993, p.53) and hoped the 
cooperation to be able to insist for a long time.
Except having something in common in the Anti-
Japanese aggression, Kuomintang and the communist 
party had a lot of obvious differences, such as how to 
resist against the Japanese aggression, how to establish 
the country and so on; Kuomintang and the communist 
party also had a civil war for nearly ten years and the 
two sides had deep prejudices which might not be 
eliminated because of the Anti-Japanese aggression. So 
the relation of Kuomintang and the communist party 
was not stable and everything was not going smoothly. 
Early in the war of resistance against  Japanese 
aggression, CPC pointed out that “In today’s war of the 
anti-Japanese aggression, there are great risks.” In the 
process of the war, “many setbacks, retreats, internal 
differentiation and mutiny, temporary and partial 
compromise and other adverse circumstances may 
happen”2. In comparison of power, the Communist Party 
of China belonged to the weak party, and Kuomintang 
already began to show “arrogant spirit, lack of self-
criticism”3, “Internal contradictions and friction of the 
unity front are inevitable, and can only weaken but 
disappear” (Mao, 1937/1993, p.53). How to maintain the 
overall situation of the cooperation between Kuomintang 
and the Communist Party, and adhere it to the end of the 
war, was a serious challenge for the Communist Party.
Facing the differences and contradictions between 
Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the Communist 
Party of China had always adhered to the principle of both 
unity and struggle, kept struggle but not broken, fought 
for the unity, so that the cooperation continued to run 
although it encountered many difficult situations. Even 
in the Southern Anhui Incident, the Communist Party 
of China upheld the principle of “taking comprehensive 
offensive in politics and the defensive in military affairs”4, 
adhered to that as long as Jiang Jieshi did not announce a 
comprehensive breakdown, the Communist Party of China 
“is also not openly putting forward anti-Jiang slogan” (The 
Archives Hall of the Central Committee, 1941/1992, p.29). This 
strategy of seeking unity through struggle controlled the 
struggle between Kuomintang and the Communist Party 
and avoided a broken cooperation.
In the early days of the war，the Communist Party 
pointed out: 
the fundamental policy for uniting the resistance powers of the 
whole nation is to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese 
National United Front, and the center link in consolidating and 
expanding the national united front is the close cooperation 
between Kuomintang and the Communist Party. (Chongqing 
Party School of CPC, para. 4, 1992, p.435)
“The cooperation between Kuomintang and the Communist 
Party is the basis of the Anti-Japanese National United 
Front and is the guarantee of founding the country and 
winning the war.5  In the whole war process, the Communist 
2 Decisions of the Central Committee on the Present Situation and Tasks of 
the Party” (1937, August 25). Selected documents of Anti-Japanese National 
United Front of CPC Central Committee (second volume, p.36). In The 
United Front Work Department of the Central Committee and The Archives 
Hall of the Central Committee (1986, ed.). Archives Publishing House.
3 Zhang Wentian and Mao Zedong’s Telegraph to Zhou Enlai et al about 
the Propaganda Content after the Completion of the Communist Party 
and Kuomintang Anti-Japanese National United Front. (1937, September 
25). Selected important literatures since the founding of CPC (fourteenth 
volume, p.536). In Party Literature Research Centre of CPC Central 
Committee and The Archives Hall of the Central Committee (Ed.).
4  Instructions of the Secretariat of CPC Central Committee for 
Zhou Enlai about taking comprehensive offensive in politics and the 
defensive in military affairs. (1941, January 25).  Selected Important 
Literatures since the Founding of CPC (eighteenth volume, p.43)
5The Sixth Enlarged Plenary Session of Sixth Central Committee of 
CPC Political Resolutions. (1938, November). Selected documents 
of CPC central committee (eleventh volume, p.753). In The 
Archives Hall of the Central Committee (1991, ed.). Party School 
of CPC Central Committee Publishing House
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Party had always paid attention to the center problem. 
As summarizing reasons for the victory of the war, the 
Communist Party of China pointed out: “The final victory 
of Anti-Japanese War is the National People’s victory, and 
also is the victory of the Communist Party adhering to 
the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the correct 
guidance method in the Anti-Japanese War” (The Archives 
Hall of the Central Committee, ed., 1945/1991, p.583). Here, 
stressing the important role of the Anti-Japanese National 
United Front in the victory of the Anti-Japanese War is to 
certainly approve the cooperation between Kuomintang 
and the Communist Party of China. The Communist Party 
maintaining the cooperation between Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party was the most powerful support for the 
Anti-Japanese National United Front.
2.  WON OVER POLITICAL POWERS: 
MADE THE MIDDLE FORCES HAVE 
MORE POSITIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE 
COMMUNIST PARTY AFTER THE WAR
The center and foundation of Anti-Japanese National 
United Front were the KMT-CPC cooperation, but not 
limited to the Communist Party and Kuomintang. “The 
Anti-Japanese National United Front is a united front 
of all political parties, all factions, all walks of life and 
all military and is a united front of workers, peasants, 
soldiers, teachers and students, businessmen, all patriotic 
compatriots.”(Mao, 1937, September 29, pp.365-366). 
So middle forces became the objects that CPC united. 
The Communist Party of China pointed out seven middle 
forces and they mainly refer to the middle parties, 
local strong factions, the national bourgeoisie and the 
Democrats in the Kuomintang in the great rear area. The 
tasks of the Communist Party of China “are winning 
over the middle groups and making them progress and 
change” (Mao, 1937, November 12, pp.395-396). For 
“parties, groups and individuals closing to us, we should 
support their development”; “make influence on other 
parties and well intentioned criticize them in order to 
promote their progress or differentiation”, “For middle 
individuals or groups, we should close to them for 
winning over them”; “we should respect for the local 
gentries of justice”6. In the war of resistance against 
Japan, for quite some time, the Communist Party did not 
have sufficient understanding of the middle forces, “For 
the time in Wuhan, CPC paid too much attention to the 
cooperation of Kuomintang and CPC, even had fantasy 
to get some results and completely neglected the small 
6Zhou Enlai’s Report Outline in the Conference of Political Bureau 
of CPC Central Committee (excerpt). (1939, August 4). Team for 
the historical materials of South Bureau of CPC (1990, ed.). The 
Historical Materials of South Bureau: The United Front (p.27). 
China: Chongqing Press.
parties and local power, to be terrified by Kuomintang 
which became easy to manipulate the situation”7. The 
situation was improved after the establishment of the 
South Bureau of the Communist Party which increased 
fighting for the middle forces and thought that the middle 
forces “can become the decisive factors in our struggle 
against the die hard” (Mao, 1940, March 11).
The main force of Communist Party was in rural 
areas as a result of the civil war of ten years. The party 
had also been influenced by the closed door policy for 
a long time and Kuomintang had long-term demonized 
propaganda about the Communist Party. The most of 
middle powers had no in-depth understanding of the 
Communist Party and the majority of them followed 
Kuomintang. Especially, they had deep doubt about 
the Communist Party having arms and bases. At the 
beginning of the war of resistance against Japan, 
although many of representatives of the national 
bourgeoisie supported the KMT-CPC cooperation, 
but they had misunderstand or even hated that the 
Communist Party of China had insisted on having the 
regime and the army, and adhering to the belief of 
communism. They thought that the communist regime 
and army were not conducive to the unified national 
government and military orders; at that time, many 
intellectuals also criticized CPC for its long and special 
relation with the Communist International. In 1936, 
Zhang Dongsun published an article and thought that “the 
slogan of hitting the imperialism was the Communist 
Party’s own slogan”, “China losses in all foreign affairs 
actually are caused by this megalomania slogan in past 
ten years”, Kuomintang’s one party dictatorship “comes 
from the Communist Party’s method”, “the Communist 
Party must declare to abandon the latent communism 
movement in the country at least in ten years in the 
national crisis”, etc..8 Although Liu Shaoji wrote a letter 
to refute Zhang Dongsun’s argument, but this argument 
represents many intellectuals’ cognition at that time. 
In 1938, Zhang Junmai published “An Open Letter 
to Mr. Mao Zedong” and pointed out that “the troops 
should belong to the state”, “the SAR system should 
be abolished ”, for giving up the belief of communism 
to“put the Marx doctrine aside temporarily”9. The 
founding Manifesto of China Democratic Political 
League put “the army nationalization” before “political 
democracy”. These situations also illustrated the middle 
7Zhou Enlai’s opinions on the united front work to Kuomintang and 
other parties (1942, September 14). The Historical Materials of 
South Bureau: The United Front (p.81).
8Zhang Dongsun: “ Review the Manifesto of the Communist Party 
and the National Cooperation”. The Cooperation of Kuomintang and 
the Communist Party during the Period of Anti-Japanese War (first 
volume, pp.202-209.
9Zhang Junmai: “An Open Letter to Mr. Mao Zedong”. The 
Cooperation of Kuomintang and the Communist Party during the 
Period of Anti-Japanese War  (first volume, pp.622-623).
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parties had doubt about the regime and the army of the 
Communist Party.
As the Anti-Japanese War going to the stalemate, 
especially the increase of friction between Kuomintang 
and the Communist Party, CPC attached great importance 
to the middle forces. Especially, after the establishment 
of the South Bureau of CPC Central Committee, CPC 
strengthened the United Front efforts to the middle forces. 
The Communist Party of China strengthened cooperation 
with anti-Japanese democratic parties and groups through 
supporting the middle forces to establish their own political 
parties; in case of major problems happening, CPC would 
had communication with middle powers early, seek their 
views and take the initiative to explain policies of CPC, 
and try to get the sympathy and support of the majority 
of the middle forces; warm welcome the middle forces 
representatives to visit the anti-Japanese bases of CPC. 
Through the deep and detailed work of the united front 
of the Communist Party of China, the middle power in 
the rear areas had greatly improved the relation with 
CPC and a lot of intellectuals also changed their inherent 
stereotype impression of the Communist Party of China, 
such as the China Democratic Political League eventually 
put the political democracy before the nationalization 
of the military in its guiding principle and more actively 
responded the idea of  coalition government put forward 
by CPC. Although the middle forces still had different 
thinking of the road of founding the country, the ideological 
belief and so on, the middle forces had greatly improved 
their understanding of the Communist Party in the later war 
indeed. Not only that, the work of the Communist Party 
also had an important effect on the middle forces’ final 
choice of following the Communist Party after the victory 
of the Anti-Japanese War. These results showed that the 
Communist Party did a good job to win over the middle 
forces in the great rear area during the Anti-Japanese War.
3.  CREATED A POLITICAL SITUATION: 
SET UP A SOLID FOUNDATION FOR 
THE CHONGQING NEGOTIATIONS 
AND THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE 
CONFERENCE AFTER THE VICTORY OF 
THE ANTI-JAPANESE WAR 
A Negotiation is based on actual power of parties and 
the power determines the content and result of the 
negotiation. The reasons for the Chongqing negotiations, 
Political Consultative Conference and other historical 
scenes happening after the war, although associated with 
the international factors, such as the US and Soviet Union 
relation and domestic political needs, the Communist 
Party of China strength was an important factor in 
numerous factors because the Communist Party’s strength 
increased rapidly during the Anti-Japanese War.
During the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist Party’s 
strength increased rapidly, especially in the armed forces, 
which benefited from the coordination work of CPC in 
the enemy’s rear areas and rear areas of the battlefields. In 
the great rear area, the Communist Party of China made 
efforts to maintain the relation between the KMT and CPC 
and these efforts also made that the Communist Party of 
China was not attacked by enemies from both sides in 
Anti-Japanese War. It was in this context, the Communist 
army had greater development. In June of 1944, the Eight 
Route Army and the New Fourth Army reached total 470 
thousands people, and the Communist Party was responsible 
for fighting with more that 1.1 millions of the puppet and 
Japanese militaries accounted for 84% of the total 1.34 
million puppet and Japanese militaries. (Ye, 1944, p.91, 81) 
Less than a year, in  April of 1945, Mao Zedong pointed 
out in “On Coalition Government”: “We have a strong 
Communist Party of China with a wealth of experience and 
1.21 million members”, “there is a strong liberated District 
including 95.5 million people, 910 thousand militaries and 
2.2 million militias”. “The liberated District battles against 
22.5 divisions including 320 thousand militaries, accounted 
for 56%” (Mao, 1945/1991,  p.1043). The strength of 
the Communist Party made Kuomintang had to increase 
considerations about a political solution when Kuomintang 
considered solving the problem of the Communist Party. 
It was in this context, Kuomintang and the Communist 
Party could have the drama of Chongqing negotiations and 
on October 10, 1945, sign “The summary of the talks of 
the government and CPC representatives” which made a 
decision to convene the Political Consultative Conference 
to solve the pending major issues related with the two sides. 
Since the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war, the 
Communist Party of China said repeatedly that it was 
against any civil war between Kuomintang and the 
Communist Party, and adhered to solve the disputes 
by negotiations peacefully. The Political Consultative 
Conference held in Chongqing and the Chongqing 
negotiations were the results which the Communist Party 
of China made consistently effort to oppose the war, strive 
for peace, and adhere to a negotiated settlement for existing 
disagreement in the great rear area during the war.
4.  THE INNOVATION OF POLITICAL 
SYSTEM: THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW 
CHINA POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEM, THE 
SYSTEM OF PEOPLE’S CONGRESS, 
AND THE SYSTEM OF REGIONAL 
ETHNIC AUTONOMY
The time of the Anti-Japanese War was the most active 
period of the various political forces in China. Many 
political practices during the war of resistance against 
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Japan were absorbed, inherited and developed after the 
establishment of the new China. The new China party 
system, the system of People’s Congress, the political 
consultative system, and national regional system were 
closely linked with the political practice in the great rear 
area during the war.
Under the leadership of CPC, the system of multi-
party cooperation and political consultation is a 
basic political system of the People’s Republic of 
China and is the political party system with Chinese 
characteristics. This system eliminates limitation of 
one party dictatorship of Kuomintang in the previous 
national political system, but the formation of this 
system must include the following elements: there must 
be a number of political parties, these political parties 
support the Communist Party and like to participate 
in the government to solve problems through political 
consultation. The formation of these elements is a result 
of political guidance of the Communist Party of China in 
the great rear area during the Anti-Japanese War.
During the Anti-Japanese War, the Communist 
Party’s united front work for the middle forces created 
many favorable conditions for the formation of political 
consultation system. In the process of interaction with 
the middle forces, the Communist Party supported 
middle power forming organizations and political 
parties, strengthened communication with middle forces, 
solved problems through consultation, and actively 
expounded policies of the Communist Party with in-
depth analysis of situations. These activities increased 
understanding of the middle forces to the Communist 
Party and had laid a solid organizational foundation for 
Chinese characteristic political party system.
So, in the period of Anti-Japanese War, the model of 
democracy was formed during CPC carrying out united 
front work in the great rear area. The model of democracy 
provided political guarantee for finally establishing the 
Chinese political party system and the system of People’s 
Congress in 1949.10
In 1938, Mao Zedong in the sixth enlarged plenary 
session of the Sixth Central Committee pointed out: 
based on the ethnic equality, respect for minorities 
and opposing Han chauvinism, “in minorities and Han 
nationality mixed areas, the local governments must 
form committees managed by the local ethnic minority 
staff themselves, and committees as part of county or 
province government manage affairs related with them 
and regulate the relations between different nationalities. 
In province and county government officials, there should 
be ethnic minority staff.” (Mao, 1938, p.620) The thought 
of the national regional autonomy has gradually become 
10Zhou, Y., & Hu, D. N. (2002). The work of the united front and 
its historical contributions of southern bureau of CPC central 
committee (p.42). Party School Journal of CPC Central Committee” 
first (Ed.).
a dominant ideology in the Communist Party of China 
solving national problems. On November 30, 1938, the 
Secretariat of the Central Committee of CPC held a 
meeting and decided to set up the Northwest  working 
committee of the Central Committee, which presided 
over the secret party work of Northwest provinces 
outside of the Shensi, Kansu and Ningxia border region. 
The Northwest working committee combined other 
institutions which were in charge of the nationality work 
and specially set up a research institution carrying out 
systematic research work on Chinese minority problems. 
This was the first time in the history that the Communist 
Party of China established a specialized research 
institution for ethnic problems. According to the needs 
of the war, although the study of  minority issues mainly 
focused on Mongolia and Hui nationalities at that time, it 
provided a reference to solve other minority issues later. 
In view of Kuomintang had a ruling government in the 
northwest, the practice of ethnic regional autonomy of 
the Communist Party could only be implemented in the 
border region. In 1942, the second session of the Shaanxi, 
Gansu, and Ningxia Border Region Council formally 
decided to set up Hui autonomous region in Xinzheng 
county of the central Shaanxi plain and Hui autonomous 
town in Huiliu village of Yanchi county. In the great rear 
area of the northwest, the study of minority policy of the 
Communist Party and the police practice in the border 
region laid a solid foundation for the system of regional 
ethnic autonomy.
5.  THE EXPANSION OF POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE: THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
HAD TRULY BECOME A NATIONAL 
POLITICAL PARTY WITH A SIGNIFICANT 
IMPACT 
Since the establishment of the Communist Party in 1921, it 
has had a rapid development. It became the second major 
political party after its first cooperation with Kuomintang. 
After Kuomintang’s “purge”, the Communist Party had 
been developing in the rural areas for a long time. The 
failure of the fifth “anti-siege” made the party suffer huge 
losses. It was forced to go a long march until arriving at 
northern Shaanxi. Especially in Kuomintang ruling areas, 
the Communist Party almost had not a completed division 
at that time. After the war broke out, more than a year, 
Mao Zedong’s speech in early 1939 pointed out that “the 
Communist Party has a few people compared with the 
people of the nation. It is a small shareholder in the United 
Front. If we fight with Japan alone, it is more difficult.” 
(Mao, 1939, January 28, p.148) At that time, although the 
public awareness about the Communist Party of China 
might be high in the nation, its strength was difficult to 
have a major impact.
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In the beginning of the Anti-Japanese War, the 
Communist Party only had more than 40,000 members. 
During the period of the war, the Party had grown. In the 
end of the war, the number of Party members reached 
1,210,000, with whom, the number of the army members 
accounted for a large proportion. In the great rear area, 
there were nearly 100,000 members. Although the share 
was not high in the total, this result was not easy to get 
in so stringent circumstances under Kuomintang ruling. 
In building the organization, after the establishment of 
the Yangtze River Bureau in 1938, it actively recovered 
and reconstructed the South regional party organizations. 
The party and work committees of provinces had been 
established in the great rear area. The party organizations 
of provinces in the great rear area had been destroyed 
by Kuomintang around 1940, but at the end of the war, 
the Communist Party had relatively sound organizations 
and a considerable number of members in provinces of 
the great rear area. For the needs of situations, most of 
these members and organizations were in the private 
states, but most of them had considerable activity energy 
and the strong ability of social mobilization. After the 
outbreak of the civil war, they played an important role 
in the movement against Kuomintang throughout the 
nation.
Before the Anti-Japanese War, according to their own 
statistics of the Communist Party of China, the Eight 
Route Army’s predecessor Red Army had 80,000 people 
and the New Fourth Army’s predecessor Red Army 
guerrillas had 12,000 (Ye, 1944, June 22, p.83), and the 
total only was less than 10,000. In the early days of the 
war, the party told Kuomintang again and again: “the Red 
Army will be a strategic guerrilla” and “Today, the Red 
Army played no role in the decisive fights” because of its 
weak military strength.11 
At the end of the war, the Communist Party had more 
than 1.2 million members, more than 1.2 million military, 
the militia reaching 2.6 million, Anti-Japanese Democratic 
base areas having nearly 1 million square kilometers, and 
a population of nearly 100 millions. In the great rear area, 
although there was no the armed forces and bases led by 
CPC, the achievements mentioned above were greatly 
related to the Communist Party’s efforts in the great rear 
area.
Before the Anti-Japanese War, many intellectuals 
thought that the Communist Party of China was an 
armed party to stick to the class struggle, have the 
belief of communism and the so-called “international 
background”. The Communist Party was considered by 
many people as “the Warlord” who adhered to the “armed 
separatism” and tried to “split” in the Republic of China. 
Through the various forms of publicity and guidance of 
the Communist Party, CPC put forward many slogans 
11 Mao Zedong Chronicle 1893 - 1949” (second volume, p.22).
and policies which had been responded more positively 
in the great rear area in the process of the Anti-Japanese 
War. After the Anti-Japanese War, The influence of the 
Communist Party of China had undergone tremendous 
changes in the great rear area. At the beginning of the 
war of resistance against Japan, Mao Zedong put forward 
that we should make “the Communist Party of China 
become the party which is nationwide and has broad 
masses of the people with the complete consolidation in 
its ideology, politics, and organization” (The Party History 
Research Centre of CPC, para. 2, 2002, p.670) which were 
initially realized in the aspect of the influence after the 
war.
6 .   S T R O N G LY P R O T E C T E D  T H E 
COMMUNIST POLIT ICAL CENTER 
O F  T H E  S H A A N X I ,  G A N S U  A N D 
NINGXIA BORDER REGION AND THE 
NORTHWEST INTERNATIONAL PASS 
The great rear area of the Northwest was an important 
pass to the Soviet Union and was an important barrier 
for the Anti-Japanese base and political center of the 
Communist Party—the Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia 
border region. During the Anti-Japanese War, the 
Communist Party recovered its organizations in 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang and other rear areas 
of the Northwest and publicly established the Eight 
Route Army offices in Lanzhou of Gansu province and 
other places. The Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia border 
region had large barren lands and the people were poor 
there. All kinds of materials were extremely scarce. 
The Communist Party in rear areas of the Northwest 
mobilized people from all walks of life to donate for 
the war and a lot of materials was transported to the 
Shaanxi, Gansu and Ningxia border region through 
the rear areas of the Northwest. These donation and 
materials strongly supported the Anti-Japanese War. 
In the great rear area of the Northwest, Even in the 
period when Kuomintang and the Communist’s relation 
deteriorated, the Communist Party also developed its 
organizations in various ways, supported democratic 
m o v e m e n t s ,  d i s c o v e r e d  K u o m i n t a n g  m i l i t a r y 
deployment in the border region around, and effectively 
protected the communist political center of the Shaanxi, 
Gansu and Ningxia border region.
In the great rear area of the Northwest, there were 
the most important international passes which the Soviet 
used to aid China, especially  Xinjiang and Gansu had 
played a decisive role during the war of resistance 
against Japan. In the early days of the war, there was 
a close cooperation between the Communist Party and 
Kuomintang authorities in these provinces to create 
a better cooperation atmosphere. The Communist 
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International also helped to transport a large number 
of military materials come from the allies to China, 
especially Soviet aided China mainly through the great 
rear area of the Northwest. These military materials 
played an important role in supporting the Anti-Japanese 
War and also were the witness for the world anti fascist 
allies working together.
The historical position of an organization is set 
according to its historical contributions. The great 
contributions made by the Communist Party in the great 
rear area of the Anti-Japanese War set up a historical 
position for the Communist Party in the great rear area. 
Comrade Song Ping had made a summary for the two 
battlefield functions of the Communist Party: 
At that time, there were two battlefields: the liberated District 
with armed struggle in the front, this was the main battlefield; 
another battle was in the great rear area, in Kuomintang’s area, 
and it was also an important battlefield. In the latter battlefield, 
our party had carried on the work in many aspects: establishing 
Party organizations at all levels; successfully carrying out the 
work of the United Front, uniting people from all levels, leading 
a lot of people, to support the Anti-Japanese War. It can be said, 
if there were not this battlefield, a lot of work and achievements 
achieved in the great rear area, it was difficult to obtain the 
military victory in the front battlefield.12
Because of the special situation in the great rear area , 
the Communist Party was mainly through the political 
guidance, this special form, to play its own unique 
role, namely the Communist Party had carried on its 
policy through the political guidance to influence the 
main political forces in the great rear area. Through the 
scientific explanation about the trend, the way and the 
ending of the Anti-Japanese War, the nation’s future 
and development direction and other major issues, the 
Communist Party led the people in the great rear area to 
support the war of resistance against Japan, oppose the 
dictatorship of Kuomintang, seek democracy, and made a 
special contributions to the victory of the Anti-Japanese 
War. These special contributions give the Communist 
Party a historical position as a political guider in the 
great rear area of the Anti-Japanese War.
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